We frame this question through Victor Frankenstein's abandonment of his creation, mirroring modern debates over AI accountability. Frankenstein serves as a jurisprudential case study for AI.
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein serves as a profound thought experiment in legal responsibility, veiled within a Gothic narrative.
Victor creates a powerful, unpredictable being.
He brings it into the world with no governance, safeguards, or integration plan.
He then panics, abandons his creation, and later denies responsibility for its actions.
This narrative closely parallels the position some modern AI developers might wish to occupy: "We built it, yes, but what it 'chose' to do was out of our hands."
Jurisprudence asks: is that a morally and legally acceptable stance?
Modern legal systems grapple with assigning responsibility when humans create powerful, partly autonomous systems like:
The law typically doesn't accept "it acted on its own" as a full defense. Instead, it asks:
Did they foresee or ought they to have foreseen the risk?
Who chose the context, scale, and safeguards (or lack thereof)?
Liability often sits with those who benefit from the risk, for policy reasons.
The "cheapest cost avoider"—the actor best positioned to reduce risk at reasonable cost. [Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970)]
In a Frankenstein framework, Victor acts as designer, deployer, and the one initially best positioned to mitigate risk, only to abandon that responsibility when it matters most.
Translating Victor’s conduct into legal terms reveals classic negligence, possibly even reckless disregard:
Creating powerful, potentially dangerous beings imposes a duty to prevent foreseeable harm.
Victor fled, providing no education, constraints, or supervision for his creation.
The creature’s isolation, suffering, and ignorance are directly linked to the harms that followed.
Resulted in deaths, wrongful conviction, and Victor’s own ruin.
If fictional scientists could be sued, Victor would likely face:
This translates directly to AI today:
These are the modern forms of “abandonment”: not disappearing physically, but stepping away from meaningful oversight while the system continues to act on society.
A strict positivist would answer: Responsibility lies where statutes, caselaw, and regulations currently assign it—usually to:
From this view, the law might lag behind technology, but until it changes, we can’t magically blame the AI. Victor’s mistake in legal terms is assuming there is a “responsibility gap” just because the creature has some independent agency.
Modern AI debates echo this: proposals to treat AI as a legal “person” risk replicating the Frankenstein move—blame the creature to shield the creator.
Natural law theorists ask: regardless of current statutes, what does practical reason and basic morality demand?
Under this lens:
Victor’s abandonment is a violation of a creator’s moral duty.
For AI developers, natural law-style reasoning says:
From a law-and-economics perspective, liability should be placed on the actor who can prevent harm at the lowest cost. [Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law]
For AI:
So, efficiency-oriented jurisprudence says:
Put primary responsibility on those who architect and deploy the system, not on downstream victims or on a fictional “personhood” of the AI.
Critical legal theories look at power and marginalization. In Frankenstein:
In AI debates:
A critical jurisprudential reading says:
In other words: don’t Frankenstein the AI—don’t let it become the scapegoat that hides human agency.
Bringing it all together under “Jurisprudence: Frankenstein and Artificial Intelligence”:
Just as Victor cannot morally or legally wash his hands of the creature, AI developers and companies cannot disclaim liability because their systems exhibit complexity, learning, or unpredictability.
In Frankenstein, the monstrous acts are the downstream consequences of a prior wrong: the creator’s failure to assume responsibility. In AI, releasing systems without adequate testing, guardrails, monitoring, or redress mechanisms is a modern form of that wrongful abandonment.
Unpredictability may complicate responsibility, but it does not nullify it. Legal doctrines already handle dangerous, partially autonomous systems—courts can analogize AI to these rather than treating it as a legal black hole.
Granting AI a quasi-personhood mainly to soak up blame risks repeating Victor’s fundamental evasion: placing fault on the creation instead of the creators and institutions that shaped it.
As Frankenstein cautions, allowing AI and humankind to blur into interchangeable actors would collapse the very framework of responsibility our legal system depends on.
Instead, our ethical and legal imperative is to forge a distinct yet collaborative partnership. Human beings must retain ultimate moral and legal authority, while AI occupies a clearly defined role as a powerful collaborator.
AI should be integrated into our institutions, but never allowed to replace or obscure the human agents who remain fundamentally answerable for its actions and impact in the world.
LIABILITY OF CREATORS